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Аннотация: Коронавирус (и заболевание, которое он вызывает, COVID-19), как оказа-
лось, переживает кризис. В том смысле, что он начался в центральной части Китая и рас-
пространился на запад, в Индо-Тихоокеанский регион, к Европе и, в тоже время, на восток, 
в Северную Америку. Его влияние ощущалось наиболее интенсивно в нескольких возник-
ших горячих точках, таких как Испания и Италия. Через несколько месяцев эта пробле-
ма стала глобальным пандемическим и экономическим кризисом. Он распространяется 
на все континенты. Для Китая, где коронавирус начался как национальная эпидемия, про-
блемы носили двоякий характер: во-первых, вирус нарушил производственные процессы 
в Китае, поскольку работники заразились быстро и легко распространяющимся вирусом, 
во-вторых, нарушил цепочку поставок в результате чего, внутренние и экспортные товары 
и услуги быстро сократились.
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Abstract: The coronavirus (and the disease it causes, COVID-19) has proven to be a rolling cri-
sis. Rolling in the sense that it began in central China and spread westward to the Indo-Pacific 
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region toward Europe and at the same time eastward into North America. Its impacts have been 
felt most intensely, so far, in several emerging hotspots along the way, such as Spain and Italy. In 
a matter of a few months it became a truly global pandemic and economic crisis. It continues to 
spread to all inhabited continents. 
For China, where the coronavirus started as a national epidemic, the problems were two-fold: 
first the virus disrupted China’s manufacturing processes as workers became infected with a 
fast and easy-spreading coronavirus and, secondly, disrupted the supply chain as demand for its 
domestic and export goods and services rapidly decreased.
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The novel coronavirus is an unknown vi-
rus never before encountered and, as a result, 
medical experts worldwide are learning about 
it in real time until enough data has been col-
lected to be able to create a vaccine. Being 
novel, the infectious disease experts in all 
countries (both in industrialized and emerging 
economies), were unaware of and unprepared 
for how dangerous this virus could be. When it 
came to understanding the characteristics and 
behavior of and response to the virus, global 
governments, including China, soon realized 
they had to be on a steep learning curve to not 
only try to mitigate the rapid increase of infec-
tion, but also understand the virus itself.
 While a growing number of cases of the 
virus was detected in December 2019, Ma 
wrote that «Interviews with whistle-blowers 
from the medical community suggest Chinese 
doctors only realized they were dealing with 
a new disease in late December» [1]. The epi-
center was identified as Wuhan, one of China’s 
major manufacturing hubs (Hubei Province). 
Coronavirus has proven to be highly conta-
gious and spreads easily and quickly. Because 
it was novel, and so easily spread, no on-the-
shelf or ready-to-use vaccine exists. An inten-
sive search for a potential vaccine has already 
begun, but the likelihood of success vaccine 
is still roughly a year or so away from com-
pletion.
While the number of coronavirus infections 
in various countries in Europe and in the US 
are rising exponentially into Spring 2020, 
COVID-19 cases are expected to increase dra-
matically in sub-Saharan Africa, South, Cen-
tral and Southeast Asia. While several parts of 
the world are struggling to contain the spread-
ing of COVID-19, China has apparently made 
significant progress toward containment. In 
mid-March the Chinese government report-
ed that the virus tide in China had begun to 
ebb, as new cases were apparently declining 
for the first time since the outbreak. Only the 
next several months will tell how successful 
national efforts at controlling the community 
spreading of COVID-19 have been. However, 
governments are under pressure to get their 
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economies back on track again and getting 
workers’ lives back to normal. As containment 
of the virus appears to be working, there is a 
risk of that governments will remove remove 
restrictions such as stay-in-place quarantines. 
American epidemiologist, Anthony Faucci has, 
in essence, warned political leaders in the US 
that the disease not the politicians will deter-
mine when COVID-19 has been successfully 
dealt with.
Korea and Hong Kong have been relatively 
successful in their effort to cope early with the 
first wave of coronavirus cases in their countries. 
Taiwan is another success story from Asia. Yip 
noted that «With only 67 cases as of March 16 
and 1 death, Taiwan’s use of social awareness, 
appropriate action of infected individuals and 
big data analysis has given the country an upper 
hand in controlling the spread of the virus and 
has been able to achieve better results than Chi-
na, but without the draconian measures of mar-
tial law and forced quarantine» [2]. As China 
attempted to bury the information that Chinese 
Dr. Li discovered, Taiwan used that information 
as an early warning about a possible pandemic. 
Chinese leaders have been criticized for their 
lack of transparency during the onset of the 
domestic virus outbreak [3]. The South Chi-
na Morning Post (Hong Kong) noted that the 
US, for example, now in the midst of its own 
coronavirus epidemic, questions the official 
Chinese numbers of its virus cases and deaths 
as U.S. reported numbers well surpassed those 
of China. Creating a name for the virus has 
been used politically as a weapon by those 
wanting to blame China for this pandemic. 
For example, the virus has been pejoratively 
labeled as the Chinese Communist Party virus 
(CCP virus), or the China and the Wuhan virus 
(by President Trump). A Chinese official then 
suggested that the virus was started in China 
by a US military operation with the intention 
to cripple the Chinese economy. a US Con-
gressman, similarly, suggested his conspiracy 
theory that the pandemic was the result of an 
inadvertent release of the virus by a Chinese 
biological warfare research institute in Wuhan. 
Both conspiracy theories have been discred-
ited and refuted. In fact, blaming the coronavi-
rus release is one way that a government can 
weaponize the situation by creating an imagi-
nary external rival which deflects and distract 
the public eye away from domestic problems: 
for the US that “rival” is China [4]. Zimmer 
reported that the most recent study on the or-
igin of the coronavirus outbreak in the New 
York (east coast) area identified Europe as the 
source, not China. He wrote, «New research 
indicates that the coronavirus began to circu-
late in the New York area by mid-February, 
weeks before the first confirmed case, and that 
travelers brought in the virus mainly from Eu-
rope, not Asia» [5].
These concerns — a politically inspired 
«blame game» — are best addressed once the 
pandemic has ended. They should not detract 
from the apparent positive outcome of Chi-
na’s swift draconian quarantine and lockdown 
measures in Wuhan, in Hubei Province and 
then throughout the country. Such unprece-
dented actions are proving to have gained con-
trol over community spread of the virus within 
its borders. If sustained, it provides hope to 
other nations that effective ways do exist to 
mitigate the community spread of the virus, 
e.g. very early testing, ‘contact tracing’ and 
lengthy quarantines or lockdowns.
SELECTED IMPACTS OF THE CORONAVIRUS 
PANDEMIC ON CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 
INITIATIVE (BRI) 
China’s economy, its population’s well-be-
ing and its global reputation as a rising super-
power was each affected by the initial out-
break and its corresponding responses to the 
coronavirus over only a few months. A key 
aspect over the past several years of its rising 
superpower status has been its Belt and Road 
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Initiative (BRI). Facts as well as speculation 
have now surfaced about the virus’s effect on 
the China-sponsored infrastructure projects to 
foster connectivity, enhancing effective and 
efficient trade. Former Australian Prime Min-
ister Rudd suggested that «[T]he coronavirus 
represents the single biggest challenge for Xi 
Jinping since he became general secretary of 
the CCP in 2012» [6].
The following paragraphs provide some ex-
amples of the impacts of the coronavirus on 
One Belt One Road (OBOR)/BRI while the 
global pandemic is still in progress. They are 
taken from popular news sources. The com-
ments are clustered into the following catego-
ries: 
1. OBOR/BRI-related impacts of coronavirus 
within China; 
2. Pandemic-related impacts on BRI partner 
countries; 
3. Actions of BRI partners toward China dur-
ing the pandemic; 
4. General impacts (domestic and internation-
al) on China’s BRI; 
5. International speculation about the future of 
BRI as a result of the pandemic.
BRI-RELATED IMPACTS OF CORONAVIRUS 
INSIDE CHINA
Compounding the economic and political 
consequences of the US-inspired trade war 
with China on the Chinese economy, the out-
break of the novel coronavirus set off a chain 
of events that further worsened China’s eco-
nomic situation as it entered 2020. Confronted 
with the challenge of mitigating the impacts 
of a new type of highly infectious coronavi-
rus, there was no quick way to identify those 
infected and no vaccine had yet been creat-
ed. With cases rising rapidly in its national 
epidemic, the government took draconian 
measures to lock down the country at the end 
of January, which happened to coincide with 
the onset of the Chinese Lunar New Year hol-
iday. During an interview, a Wuhan respiratory 
disease doctor was asked «What would have 
happened if Wuhan had not closed?». He re-
sponded: «The closing took place on the eve 
of the Chinese New Year holiday. This period 
represents the largest migration on the planet. 
It is a Chinese tradition to come home to visit 
relatives. Our population would have moved 
in large numbers, more than any other country. 
For us, this measure was essential» [7].
The Chinese population had already begun 
to visit their families in other parts of the 
country. As a result, workers who had trave-
led home were unable to get back to factories 
where they were employed because of the 
quarantine. Without their workforce, factories 
and businesses were forced to close. Domes-
tic and global supply chains were disrupted 
not only by the slowdown or shutdown of 
factories, but also by travel bans to produc-
ers (China) and consumer countries including 
BRI partners — many of which rely heavily 
on material, management and labor support 
from China. 
Some observers suggested that internal pres-
sure was mounting about China’s spending 
abroad (such as for the BRI) instead of at home. 
For example, one response to the pandemic 
was that China’s banks were ordered to support 
activities and workers in OBOR countries con-
cerned about importing the virus from foreign 
visitors. According to one source, even the 
Chinese Communist Party, was also concerned 
that Xi’s BRI financial commitments abroad 
(centered on OBOR partners) were overex-
tending China’s financial capabilities [6]. 
CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC-RELATED IMPACTS 
ON BRI PARTNER COUNTRIES
Many Chinese laborers, engineers and pro-
ject managers who had returned to China dur-
ing the Chinese New Year were denied visas 
to reenter the various BRI countries in which 
they had been working, as a result of various 
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travel restrictions. Restrictions were levied by 
China and BRI countries. BRI governments 
feared that travelers arriving from China might 
carry the virus into their countries. Chinese 
workers that had stayed in the BRI country of 
their employment during the Chinese holiday 
were quarantined. Also, supply chain disrup-
tions of varying degrees impacted machinery 
and construction material deliveries, hinder-
ing work on OBOR infrastructure projects. 
Zhai and Tostevin, for example, reported that, 
as of mid-February, «Many factories in Chi-
na remain closed; those that are open cannot 
reach full capacity... Since many BRI projects 
tend to source equipment and machinery from 
manufacturers based in China, the disruptions 
in industrial production and supply chains will 
cause further delays» [8]. 
Commenting on a report focused on COV-
ID-19 impact on the BRI in Africa, a news 
release by Baker McKenzie noted that «the 
ripple effects of COVID-19 are affecting the 
nature, pace and scope of China’s BRI activity 
in Africa, mostly for the short term» [9]. The 
release included a succinct statement by the 
company’s manager in South Africa: «Any 
largescale outbreak of COVID-19 in Africa 
will put pressure on already strained public 
health systems». The new release concluded 
with the following: «The project delays are 
expected to be mostly short term; and future 
initiatives will now have a heightened focus 
on sustainability — improving not only their 
long-term outlook, but also the sustained 
health of the environment and most important-
ly, Africa’s people» [9]. 
Some writers suggested that the virus-relat-
ed delays in progress on the BRI infrastructure 
and trade projects had provided time for both 
parties, China and project partners, to renew, 
review or reconsider their loans agreements 
or their commitments to their cooperative BRI 
infrastructure construction projects. Shepard 
reported that before the coronavirus epidemic 
emerged, China as well as some of its country 
partners were already rethinking various as-
pects of BRI: there could be a greater focus 
on the greening of OBOR [10]; China could 
make its loans less aggressive; it could focus 
on fewer projects [11].
ACTIONS OF BRI PARTNERS TOWARD CHINA 
DURING THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
During the pandemic, various BRI coun-
tries took action to block the entry of any 
travelers coming from China, including re-
turning BRI Chinese workers, engineers and 
managers. Those coming back from China as 
permitted workers into a BRI country were 
required to be tested and quarantined for 
several weeks. Chinese workers already in a 
BRI country were also tested and quarantined. 
However, BRI country responses varied: Pa-
kistan, for example, a flagship project of the 
BRI, asked Chinese workers associated with 
CPEC projects in Pakistan to delay their re-
turn from China. Thus, the pandemic brought 
to a temporary (e.g. short term) halt some 
on-going BRI works [12]. For its response, 
Kazakhstan suspended issuing visas to visi-
tors from China and closed the borders of its 
free trade zone [12]. Indonesia banned flights 
from China. Restrictions ratcheted upward, 
as various OBOR governments took the pan-
demic’s impacts more seriously and restrict-
ed visas for returning workers from China to 
work on their infrastructure and other con-
struction projects. 
GENERAL IMPACTS ON CHINA’S BRI
There are wide-ranging views, spanning 
from supportive to critical, about various as-
pects of the novel coronavirus’s outbreak and 
China’s lack of transparency about it as well as 
its handling of global spread to other countries. 
Several articles related to the virus’s adverse 
impacts on OBOR/BRI. The Nikkei Asian 
Review suggested, «the epidemic will not 
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only affect international freight trains that run 
between Wuhan and Duisberg, Germany but 
will also negatively impact the infrastructure 
drive» [13]. 
Fazl-e-Haider’s article was entitled «Coro-
navirus brings halt to China’s Trillion-dollar 
Belt and Road Initiative» [14]. Ahmed sug-
gested the «coronavirus… created a global 
health emergency, dented the global economy 
and can hamper China’s ambitious BRI» [13]. 
He wrote that «Wuhan’s position as a strategic 
hub has backfired and worked as a negative 
factor». He also suggested that «No propagan-
da could damage or hamper China’s ambitious 
BRI as the coronavirus outbreak has done in 
a month hampering the mega trade and infra-
structure plan» [13]. 
On the positive side, Lancaster et al. ob-
served that «the Chinese government is 
clearly trying to bolster its own global gov-
ernance role by establishing itself as a coun-
try-COVID-19 leader in word and deed... 
China is even beginning to provide material 
aid to BRI countries afflicted by the pandem-
ic» [3]. The World Economic Forum-Beijing 
identified some ways that Chinese compa-
nies were providing help at home and abroad 
to those affected by the virus, such as «do-
nating supplies to affected areas and “work-
ing to keep the supply chains open”» [15]. 
Rudd strongly suggested that President Xi’s 
China will continue its «effort to become a 
‘technological Superpower with 5G domi-
nance, semiconductors, supercomputing and 
artificial intelligence» [6]. He also wrote that 
China sees BRI «as a Chinese internation-
al institution, as China wants to rebuild the 
world international order in which it holds 
key positions» [6]. 
There are also neutral views as reported by 
the media, e.g. existing projects delayed and 
timelines for their completion revised. New 
projects or aspects of them that are under ne-
gotiation are likely to be reconsidered. 
SPECULATION ABOUT OBOR’S POST-
CORONAVIRUS FUTURE
Speculative comments about the sustaina-
bility of the OBOR’s post-coronavirus future, 
had a more positive tone. Chinese government 
sources suggested there were no lengthy de-
lays in OBOR projects. Reports noted that the 
BRI is not only a symbol of President Xi’s re-
gime, but it is also a symbol of China as a great 
power. So, «Beijing is not likely to abandon 
BRI anytime soon» [16]. Shepard speculated 
that «foreign firms will not look for alterna-
tive supply chains because of coronavirus» 
[10]. More so now that new Chinese cases 
are declining, quarantines starting to be lifted, 
and factories are re-opening or getting back to 
full-time operation. Shepard also noted that 
Xi wants to get OBOR projects going again to 
show life has returned to normal.
The reinstating of the OBOR/BRI initiative 
at its full operational capacity is a question that 
only time will answer. As China begins to lift 
its quarantine measures, some BRI countries 
(as well as other countries not affiliated with 
OBOR/BRI) are speculating that allowing the 
Chinese economy to restart is too soon. He 
noted in her article that «the pandemic is still 
wreaking havoc on the rest of the world, rais-
ing fears of a potential second wave of infec-
tions as people return from overseas and bring 
the virus with them. Add to that the risk of an-
other outbreak, if the virus hasn’t been totally 
eradicated in local communities» [17]. Fear 
that a resurgence of the COVID-19 virus not 
only in local economies, but nationwide has 
created a barrier to distancing and self-solitary 
confinement that China will have to overcome 
in order to regain its full economic operational 
strength.
President Xi asked the Prime Minister of 
Italy at the height of the pandemic about de-
veloping a Health Silk Road [18]. This call 
for a health silk road has found support in 
Europe [19]. OBOReurope [20] also stated 
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that «the BRI can … act as a global plat-
form to study new threats to health and find 
solutions by strengthening cooperation be-
tween Chinese and foreign labs». At the least, 
«health has been added under sustainability 
for BRI project workers and partner country 
inhabitants» [11].
There have been many critiques of OBOR/
BRI ever since it was launched in September 
2013, mostly from countries that are China’s 
regional or global political rivals (e.g. the 
United States under President Trump, India, 
Japan, Korea). While they might have cheered 
China’s initial economic downturn — because 
of the impacts of Trump’s trade war and now 
as a result of the coronavirus pandemic — the 
pandemic may prove to be having the oppo-
site effect. Rogin reported that while President 
Trump is using this virus as a reason to de-
couple the US and Chinese economies, China 
is viewing this pandemic as a way to further 
cooperation and interconnectedness. He wrote 
«China intends to seek out more foreign di-
rect investment, seize market share in critical 
industries and try to stop the West from con-
fronting its bad behavior» [21].
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The definition of crisis in the Chinese lan-
guage is made up of two characters: one is 
danger and the other is opportunity. It should 
not be surprising, then, to find articles in which 
the writer(s) use both negative (e.g. danger) 
and positive (e.g. opportunity) aspects of the 
coronavirus pandemic in the same thought. 
China has been criticized for its initial secrecy 
resulting from a general lack of transparency 
that delayed the raising of awareness about 
the novel coronavirus. The Chinese doctor 
who warned the people and government to 
the dangerous virus was heavily criticized 
for causing panic and put under house arrest. 
He later died from COVID-19 but was later 
praised as a national hero. 
However, once the Chinese government 
realized that the coronavirus was truly a na-
tional epidemic, it instituted strict quarantine 
measures first in Wuhan, then across the entire 
country. The coronavirus apparently peaked 
four months later in March and restrictions be-
gan to be lifted in various places. 
Although China was criticized for its lack 
of openness about an emerging pandemic, it 
is increasingly being praised for its quarantine 
measures within its borders. Today, by provid-
ing health-related guidance and medical ma-
terials, its help is being praised by developing 
countries beginning to suffer from the corona-
virus. This turnabout is being acknowledged 
on an increasing basis through the media as 
exemplified in the title of the article «China 
and Coronavirus: From home-made disaster to 
global mega-opportunity» [22] and its subtitle, 
«Despite an initially horrendous response, Chi-
na now utilizes its Coronavirus campaign to 
build global soft power».
Wu and Wong provided similar examples 
[23]:
• «The notion of ‘health silk road’ could cover 
up Beijing’s mistakes in handling early stag-
es of coronavirus outbreak».
• «In health, China has consolidated its lead-
ing role among belt and road partner nations 
as the coronavirus outbreak has spread». 
• «COVID-19 is a golden opportunity for Chi-
na to demonstrate leadership and responsi-
bility». 
• «The underlying contradiction, however, is 
that belt and road is a symbol of Chinese-led 
efforts at promoting the benefits of connec-
tivity, while the virus has exposed the risks 
and weaknesses of connectivity on a global 
scale». 
• «Its ability to meet the demands of countries 
- especially those with less developed public 
health systems - could also give China an 
opportunity to draw a veil over its mistakes 
in the initial stages of the virus outbreak».
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CONCLUSION (WHAT IS NEXT FOR OBOR?)
As the pandemic continues to «roll» around 
the globe, speculation will continue to grow 
about what the post-coronavirus world might 
look like, not only within China and scores 
of OBOR countries, but around the globe. 
The global economy will need time to recov-
er from the cost to national economies as a 
result of the extreme measures of shutdowns 
imposed by governments to combat the pan-
demic. It appears that support for «globaliza-
tion» is under threat, because of pre-existing 
poverty resulting in disproportionate impacts 
of the virus within and among industrial 
and developing economies. A recent article 
suggested that OBOR provides a pathway, 
through connectivity and trade, for disease 
spreading, citing pandemics that occurred in 
past centuries [24], The New Silk Roads, cit-
ed in Shepard [10].
In his article with a sub-section labeled 
«stealing the soft power mantle from the U.S.», 
Kurlantzick offered the following perspective: 
«Ultimately, Beijing seems ready to use the 
outbreak to more broadly signal that China’s 
model of governance is effective, particularly 
in a crisis, and especially when compared to 
that of most democracies» [22]. On the other 
hand, the Council of Foreign Relations correct-
ly warned its readers that «It is too soon to say 
precisely how the pandemic will change the 
broad contours of Chinese foreign policy, but 
it has already highlighted some of the frailties 
of the Belt and Road Initiative Xi’s signature 
foreign policy agenda to build traditional and 
digital infrastructure around the world» [3].
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